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ABSTRACT 
In the discussion about the role of religious reasons in the public sphere,     
Habermas has developed a middle-ground position defined by his institutional 
translation proviso. After a presentation of Habermas’s postsecular perspec-
tive, we analyze the specificity of his account of public reason by comparing it 
with the position of John Rawls. We argue that Habermas’s interpretation of 
Rawls’s position is not fully correct and that it is therefore less clear than    
Habermas assumes that Habermas indeed advocates the more inclusionist po-
sition of the two. 
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1. HABERMAS’S POSTSECULAR PERSPECTIVE 
In recent years, Jürgen Habermas has become an interesting voice in the 
debate on the role of religion in the public sphere. His approach starts from 
the assumption that current day society should be characterized as a postse-
cular one. In spite of sociological secularization and in spite of what he used 
to believe himself, Habermas now acknowledges that religion will not disap-
pear as a relevant influence neither in the lives of individuals nor in the cul-
tural and political arena.  
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Today, public consciousness in Europe can be described in terms of a ‘post-
secular society’ to the extent that at present it still has to ‘adjust itself to the 
continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized 
environment’.1 
In this postsecular context, a peaceful coexistence of religious and secu-
lar citizens in a democratic constitutional state requires, Habermas argues, a 
complementary learning process. Orthodox religious traditions should be-
come reflexive in the sense that religious citizens should find ways to recon-
cile their own religious beliefs with respect for the freedom of religion of oth-
ers, with the acknowledgment of the independent validity of scientific know-
ledge as well as with the secular character of the constitutional state.2 On the 
secular side, citizens should develop a postmetaphysical thinking which ac-
cepts that religions are not necessarily irrational relics of premodern times. 
Secular citizens should appreciate that religious discourse might contain re-
levant meanings which could perhaps be translated and introduced into se-
cular political discourse. What is at stake here is more than a respectful sen-
sibility for the possible existential significance of religion for other persons. 
The postsecular perspective requires that religious contributions to conten-
tious political issues can be taken seriously and that secular citizens in the 
public sphere must be able to speak with their religious fellow citizens as 
equals.  
Secular citizens, in their role as citizens, may neither deny that religious 
worldviews are in principle capable of truth nor question the right of their de-
vout fellow citizens to couch their contributions to public discussions in reli-
gious language.3 
 
 
2. SHARING THE MIDDLE GROUND 
This postsecular perspective provides the background for Habermas’s 
analysis of the place of religious arguments in public reason. Habermas de-
velops a middle-ground position between exclusionists like Robert Audi on 
                                                 
1 Jürgen Habermas, Notes on a post-secular society, 2008 
[http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html]; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ in: idem, 
The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003), 101-115, esp. 104. 
2 Habermas, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 104; Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 2008), 136-7. 
3 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 113. 
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the one hand and inclusionists like Nicholas Wolterstorff and Paul Weith-
man on the other. This middle-ground position is defined by what Habermas 
calls the institutional translation proviso. This proviso states that religious 
reasons can be introduced into the debate in the informal public sphere pro-
vided that, in the course of the debate, these religious reasons are adequately 
translated into secular reasons equally accessible to all. Importantly, this 
process of translation has to be completed before the debate crosses over into 
the formalized institutions of democratic decision-making such as parlia-
ment and government.4 The proviso thus operates as a necessary filter be-
tween the informal and the formal public sphere.5 Because legitimate democ-
ratic decisions should be based on a reasonable agreement between all citi-
zens and because the particularity of religious reasons precludes such an 
agreement, these reasons are no longer acceptable in the more formal con-
text of actual decision-making. 
… only those political decisions can count as legitimate that can be impartially 
justified in the light of generally accessible reasons, in other words, that can be 
justified equally toward religious and nonreligious citizens and citizens of dif-
ferent confessions.6 
 
Habermas recognizes that his position has important affinities with 
Rawls’s.7 Like Habermas, Rawls emphasizes that political decisions are le-
gitimate only to the extent that they are based on a reasonable agreement 
between citizens. In the absence of such an agreement, political decisions are 
necessarily coercive for at least some groups of citizens. 
Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals ac-
ceptable to them as reasonable and rational.8 
In this context, Rawls advocates a duty of civility according to which citizens 
should be prepared to provide reasons in support of their political positions. 
                                                 
4 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 130-1. 
5 For this distinction see Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press 1996), 304-8. 
6 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 122. 
7 Ibid., 119-23. 
8 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press 1996), 217, also at 
137. 
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Thereby, the reasons used should be based on the political values of public 
reason, i.e. values acceptable to all reasonable and rational citizens and as 
such part of the overlapping consensus.9 Rawls emphasizes that this duty is a 
moral duty, not a legal duty for in that case it would be incompatible with 
freedom of speech. 
In his latest texts on public reason (The idea of public reason revisited, 
and Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism) Rawls devel-
oped what he called a ‘wide view of public political culture’ and explained 
more explicitly to what extent religious arguments are allowed to enter pub-
lic debate. He thereby introduced his famous proviso which states that  
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, may be intro-
duced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course, 
proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doc-
trines – are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehen-
sive doctrines are said to support.10  
So, religious reasons are not excluded from public debate but they can only 
be introduced on the condition that in the course of the debate adequate rea-
sons acceptable to all reasonable citizens are also provided. However, in ap-
plying this proviso, two further qualifications should be noted.11 First, Rawls 
indicates that the proviso does not hold for the background culture. In civil 
society religious and other comprehensive doctrines may properly play a role, 
without any restrictions. Secondly, the limits imposed by public reason and 
the proviso do not apply to all political questions indiscriminately, but only 
to those ‘involving what we may call “constitutional essentials” and questions 
of basic justice’.12 As a result, the proviso is in the first place relevant in the 
official discourse of judges, legislators, chief executives, and other govern-
ment officials. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217; Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ in: Rawls, The Law 
of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2001), 129-180, esp. 135ff. 
10 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Ii-Iii; Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 152, 144. 
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, I, 213-16, 220-3, 382; Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 152-
3, 133-4. 
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214. 
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3. CLARIFYING THE DISTINCTIONS 
Although there are important similarities between the positions of 
Rawls and Habermas, it is interesting to get a better grip on the remaining 
differences. In this regard, Habermas claims to defend the more inclusionist 
position. This claim is, however, partly based on an obvious misunderstand-
ing by Habermas of Rawls’s position.  
The principle of separation of church and state obliges politicians and officials 
within political institutions to formulate and justify laws, court rulings, de-
crees, and measures exclusively in a language that is equally accessible to all 
citizens. By contrast, [Rawls’s] proviso to which citizens, political parties and 
their candidates, social organizations, churches, and other religious associa-
tions are subject in the public arena [in der politischen Öffentlichkeit] is not 
quite so strict.13 
In this quote, Habermas wrongly assumes that Rawls is equally demanding as 
he is in terms of imposing a strict ban of religious arguments in what Haber-
mas would call the formal public sphere. Additionally, Habermas wrongly 
assumes that Rawls applies his proviso to the informal public sphere and 
thereby imposes the proviso to all participants individually, requiring that all 
participants in the informal public debate should be able, in due course, to 
provide secular reasons for all the political positions they defend. This posi-
tion then allegedly contrasts with Habermas’s in the sense that Habermas 
conceives of the duty for citizens in the informal public sphere to provide 
translations of religious arguments into arguments equally accessible to all as 
a collective rather than an individual duty.  
The misunderstandings contained in these claims arise because Haber-
mas wrongly identifies what Rawls calls ‘the political public sphere’ with what 
he himself calls the ‘informal public sphere’ whereas, in fact, the ‘political 
public sphere’ as defined by Rawls basically corresponds to Habermas’s for-
mal public sphere.14 As a result of this confusion, Habermas is two times 
wrong and it is Rawls who actually seems to defend the more inclusionist 
position. In the context of the formal public sphere, Habermas rejects all reli-
gious arguments. In contrast, Rawls allows them here on the condition that 
the proviso is met. In the context of the informal public sphere, which Rawls 
calls the ‘background culture’, Habermas applies his proviso which says that 
                                                 
13 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 122. 
14 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 133-4. 
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religious arguments are allowed provided they are translated into arguments 
equally accessible to all before they enter into the formal public debate. For 
Rawls, in contrast, political debate in the background culture is fully open 
and no restrictions whatsoever are imposed.15  
Rawls is also more inclusionist in the sense that his proviso only holds 
for constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, whereas Habermas’s 
proviso covers all political issues. However, Habermas plausibly argues that 
the distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘fundamental’ political issues is moot. 
In our modern legal systems in which basic rights directly affect concrete leg-
islation, the domain of constitutional essentials is much broader than Rawls 
seems to suggest.16 
 
Although there is an important sense in which Rawls is the more inclu-
sionist of the two, Habermas is not completely mistaken. In spite of the fact 
that Rawls leaves the background culture completely open, he nevertheless 
imposes the use of public reason on individual citizens when they are voting 
‘in elections when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at 
stake’.17 Here, Habermas disagrees. He clearly defends the more inclusionist 
position and allows religious people to vote in light of their religious beliefs. 
And certainly the normative expectation that all religious citizens when casting 
their vote should ultimately let themselves be guided by secular considerations 
is to ignore the realities of a devout life, an existence guided by faith.18 
In view of these intricacies, it should be clear that an analysis of the differ-
ences between Rawls and Habermas cannot simply be made in terms of who 
is the more inclusionist. In these terms, a clear-cut answer is not possible. In 
order to better understand their differences, it is necessary to dig a bit deeper 
and to assess more carefully Habermas’s arguments in explaining his differ-
ences with Rawls.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 134, 152, 153 n.51; Rawls, Political Liberalism, I, 215, 
220, 382. 
16 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 123, n.18. 
17 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215; see also 241-3 and Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 
135. 
18 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 129. 
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4. DIGGING DEEPER. HABERMAS’S THREE ARGUMENTS 
In support of his claim that his own position is more inclusionist than 
Rawls’s, Habermas advances three main arguments.19  
His first is sociological. Although there are examples to the contrary, re-
ligious communities and churches have, in the past, played a positive role for 
liberal political culture.20 In this regard, Habermas mentions Martin Luther 
King and the US civil rights movement, but also American civil religion. En-
dorsing a similar claim by Weithmann, Habermas argues that religious 
movements  
... provide arguments for public debates on crucial morally loaded issues and 
fulfil tasks of political socialization by informing their members and encourag-
ing them to participate in the political process.21 
Rawls’s critics have suggested that Rawls’s proviso might hamper this socio-
logical function of religious communities because the duty to always find 
secular equivalents ‘for every religious statement they pronounce’ threatens 
to undermine their commitment to civil society. Obviously, this critique is 
based again on a misreading of Rawls. Since Rawls has no intention whatso-
ever of imposing the proviso on participants in the wider civil society, the 
critique misses the mark. In fact, Rawls himself cites Martin Luther King’s 
interventions as a clear example of religiously inspired contributions to the 
political process which are in line with the requirements of public reason.22 
Therefore, Habermas is right when he writes that this sociological argument 
is not the central objection to Rawls’s theory.23 
 
Habermas’s second argument is of a more existential nature and hinges 
on the idea that any ‘ought’ implies a ‘can’.  
[...] a state cannot encumber its citizens, to whom it guarantees freedom of re-
ligion, with duties that are incompatible with pursuing a devout life – it cannot 
expect something impossible of them.24  
                                                 
19 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 124-32. 
20 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 125. See also Paul Weithman, Religion and the 
Obligations of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 91. 
21 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 125. 
22 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 249-51. 
23 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 125. 
24 Ibid., 126. 
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The inability referred to could be due to the fact that citizens who take a 
stance on political issues from a religious perspective do not have enough 
knowledge or imagination to find equivalent secular justifications for their 
views. Apart from the lack of knowledge or imagination, the inability to meet 
the proviso could, moreover, also have deeper origins. Endorsing a similar 
claim by Wolterstorff, Habermas emphasizes that it may, from the perspec-
tive of religious citizens, be an existential necessity ‘to base their decisions 
concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions.’25 In-
deed, genuine faith is not simply a doctrine religious people endorse but also 
a source of energy that nurtures the whole life of the devout person.26 
Habermas therefore concludes that a liberal state, which expressly protects 
religious ways of life, cannot expect religious citizens and organizations to 
justify their political positions independently of their religious worldview. 
This duty can only be imposed on persons in the formal public sphere.27 
With this second argument, Habermas explicitly challenges the exclu-
sionist account of Audi who advocates the principles of secular justification 
and secular motivation.28 For Habermas, it is unrealistic to hold these princi-
ples, because some religious citizens may not be able to fulfil them. Agreeing 
with Weithman that some religious persons are incapable of discerning ‘any 
“pull” from any secular reasons’29, Habermas argues that religious people 
should be able to make contributions to the political debate without having 
to provide adequate translations for their arguments themselves.30 Instead, 
                                                 
25 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The role of religion in decision and discussion of political issues,’ in: 
Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (London: Rowman and Littlefield 
1997), 67-120, 105. 
26 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 127. 
27 Ibid., 128. 
It remains unclear why translation should already be completed before the debate enters the 
formal decision-making institutions. Habermas writes that we cannot make a split between political 
and religious identity of actors in the informal public sphere, but he still allows this split on the formal 
level. It is not clear why this split here does not remain cause for concern and why Habermas cannot 
allow the inclusion of (non-authoritarian) religious and other metaphysical contributions on all levels 
of democratic deliberation. See also Maeve Cooke, ‘Salvaging and secularizing the semantic contents of 
religion: the limitations of Habermas’s postmetaphysical proposal,’ International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion 60 (2006), 187-207, 196ff.; Idem, ‘A secular state for a postsecular society? Postmetaphysical 
political theory and the place of religion,’ Constellations 14 (2007) 2, 224-238. 
28 Robert Audi, ‘The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,’ Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs 18 (1989) 259-296, 293; Idem, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) 86, 96. 
29 Weithman, Religion, 157. 
30 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 128. 
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they are allowed to rely on the cooperative efforts of their fellow citizens to 
provide for these translations into reasons equally accessible to all.31 
Although Habermas convincingly distances himself from Audi, it re-
mains to be seen whether his arguments also mark a difference with Rawls. 
Here, it should be noted that Rawls would also reject the principle of secular 
motivation. As long as arguments comply with the proviso it is perfectly ac-
ceptable that they are religiously motivated.  
All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own com-
prehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it 
provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those 
grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or 
moral, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the na-
ture of their affirmation.32 
Regarding the principle of secular justification, Rawls’s position is more am-
biguous. On the one hand, he restricts the scope of the proviso to discourse 
of government officials and imposes no restrictions on public debate in the 
background culture. On the other hand, Rawls recognizes that citizens, at 
least at the time of elections, ‘are to think of themselves as if they were legis-
lators’33 and ‘are to reason by public reason […] whenever constitutional es-
sentials and matters of basic justice are at stake’34. On some readings of 
Rawls, this requirement is not simply restricted to the times of elections but 
implies more generally that (ideal) citizens are always under the moral duty 
to give neutral, political reasons in debates on constitutional essentials.35 
Whichever reading one prefers, however, the requirement for citizens to 
think of themselves as if they were legislators, marks a clear contrast with 
Habermas’s position which is more inclusionist because it does not object to 
the contributions to the informal public debate of monoglot religious citizens 
unable to translate their own religious contributions into secular language 
and because it does not require them to base their votes on secular reasons.36 
                                                 
31 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 130-2. 
32 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147-8; see also 241-2. 
33 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 135. 
34 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 168. Also Rawls, Political Liberalism, 240-1. 
35 Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15-17. For discussion see Cristina Lafont, ‘Religion in the public 
sphere: remarks on Habermas’s conception of public deliberation in postsecular societies,’ Constella-
tions 14 (2007) 2, 239-259, 240, 242, 256 nt. 20 
36 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 129-30. 
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Although, here, Habermas’s proviso seems to come out as the more in-
clusionist one, it should be noted that his allowance for the contributions of 
monoglot citizens is not without problems. First, it is unclear why religious 
citizens should be allowed to remain monoglots, unable and/or unwilling to 
translate their own religious arguments into a generally accessible language 
whereas secular citizens should not have the same privilege. In this regard, 
Lafont points out that this privilege itself is problematic because it is non-
generalizable.37 It is not only a violation of the basic principle of political 
equality, but, more importantly, if all religious citizens were to make use of 
their prerogative, it is totally unclear how the institutional translation proviso 
could ever be upheld. Secondly, the acceptance of monoglot religious contri-
butions seems to be inconsistent with some of Habermas’s other claims, most 
notably when he describes the cognitive burdens and epistemic duties reli-
gious citizens have to assume in a postsecular society. Here, Habermas 
clearly states that religious citizens are themselves responsible for ascertain-
ing the compatibility of their religious doctrines with the basic egalitarian 
and individualistic moral presuppositions of the modern constitutional 
state.38  
 
The third argument Habermas advances concerns the semantic potential 
of religious arguments. It is a core concern of Habermas’s postsecular ap-
proach that the content of religious contributions to the public debate should 
be taken seriously. The Rawlsian proviso seems to imply that religious argu-
ments do not perform any semantic work and leave the content of public rea-
son unaltered.39 Rawls argues that  
[...] the introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doc-
trines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content of 
justification in public reason itself.40 
                                                 
37 Lafont, ‘Religion,’ 251, 257-8. 
38 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 137. 
39 James Boettcher’s comparison of Rawls and Habermas in his, ‘Habermas, religion and the eth-
ics of citizenship,’ Philosophy & Social Criticism 35 (2009) 1-2, 215-238 fails to consider the differences 
between both authors in terms of the potential semantic impact of religious arguments on public rea-
son. As argued below, it is precisely here that the main differences between them are located. 
40 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 153. 
It could be objected here that Rawls has argued that his view of public reason is more open and 
dynamic than is often suggested. This alleged openness derives from the fact that public reason con-
sists of a dynamic family of political conceptions (Rawls, Political Liberalism, lii-liv; Rawls, ‘The idea of 
public reason revisited,’ 581-6). However, this is not in line with Rawls’s argument that the overlapping 
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For Habermas, in contrast, religion has a special power to give expression to 
important moral intuitions and ‘can also open the eyes of citizens to aspects 
that were hitherto neglected.’41 Crucial for Habermas but absent in Rawls, is 
the idea that religious speech is a serious vehicle for original truth contents 
that can be preserved in the translation process of making arguments equally 
accessible to all.42 
A full analysis of the relevant differences between Rawls and Habermas 
regarding the semantic role of religious contributions is complicated. Al-
though we have elaborated on this issue elsewhere43, the different scope of 
the present paper does not allow us to go through the whole argument in 
detail. Suffice it to say, here, that the completeness of Rawls’s political con-
ception of justice plays a crucial role. Since public reason as a set of political 
conceptions, is self-contained, it cannot allow for any genuine semantic ref-
erence to the comprehensive doctrines present in society. For Habermas’s 
deliberative model, in contrast, the idea of public reason is an essentially pro-
ceduralistic and constructivist one. This means that discourse theory only 
presupposes a very thin and still very vague consensus on the notion of au-
tonomy as the core value of public deliberation. In order to further elaborate 
what this means, the public debate cannot rely on some given substantive 
idea of public reason, but needs to receive further input from the citizens 
themselves. As a result, the outcome of deliberation will necessarily be co-
lored by the cultural, religious and other comprehensive doctrines present in 
society. 
We can illustrate this by means of Wolterstorff’s well known example of 
a religious argument concerning the need for unconditional access to the 
basic means of subsistence.44 Here it should be clear that the advocacy of ba-
                                                                                                                                         
consensus is ‘freestanding and complete’. We cannot elaborate on this unresolved dilemma at the core 
of Rawls’ theory here. See, however, Stefan Rummens, ‘The semantic potential of religious arguments. 
A deliberative model of the postsecular public sphere,’ Social Theory & Practice 36 (2010): 385-408, esp. 
400 n.48. 
41 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 264, see also 2, 131, 139-40, 245. 
42 In fact, Habermas argues in a review article of Rawls’s recently published BA thesis, that 
Rawls’s political liberalism itself is an ‘outstanding example of a philosophical translation’ and ‘a philo-
sophical reshaping’ of ideas and motives originating in a religious comprehensive doctrine. Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘The “Good life” – A “Detestable Phrase”: The significance of the Young Rawls’s religious 
ethics for his political theory,’ European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010) 3, 443-454.  
43 See Rummens, ‘The semantic potential’.  
44 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Why we should reject what liberalism tells us about speaking and act-
ing in public for religious reasons,’ in: Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, P. J. Weithman (ed.), 
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sic social rights as such poses no big problems for either Rawls or Habermas, 
since these rights can easily be argued for in generally accessible terms refer-
ring, for instance to the means necessary for the effective realisation of the 
individual autonomy of citizens. Interestingly, however, the debate on the 
precise content of social rights is a very lively and complex debate, in which 
many different values need to be weighed against each other. Now, obviously, 
if someone approaches these issues from a background such as Wolterstorff’s, 
it is clear that his weighing of these different aspects (merit, talent, tastes) 
and of the values involved will be influenced by his background comprehen-
sive doctrine. For the Habermasian approach, which rejects the idea of a self-
contained conception of autonomy, such an influence is not only unproble-
matic but actually inevitable. Because the a priori idea of autonomy is neces-
sarily vague and underdetermined, no strictly political answer (in the sense of 
Rawls) concerning the proper weighing and ordering of values is available. It 
is precisely the purpose of democratic deliberation for citizens to engage in 
an attempt to convince others of the relevance of their specific interpretation 
of what the requirements of autonomy are. A successful translation of a reli-
gious argument is, thereby, an argument or series of arguments which suc-
ceeds in convincing others of the general adequacy of an ordering and weigh-
ing which are religious in origin. Although, of course, the explicit references 
to religious sources of authority will be filtered out during the translation, the 
specific ordering of values which succeeds in convincing others constitutes 
that part of the original semantic content which is transferred into public 
reason. For Rawls, in contrast, the coloring of the idea of autonomy by the 
different comprehensive doctrines present in society which ensues from such 
a constructive deliberative process is unacceptable. He believes that an order-
ing of values needs to be made within the political conception itself because, 
otherwise, these values would remain “puppets manipulated from behind the 
scenes by comprehensive doctrines.”45 Rawls, in contrast with Habermas, 
does not allow the reference to a religious background doctrine to do any 
genuine semantic work when it comes to the elaboration of the requirements 
of autonomy. Precisely in this significant respect, Habermas’s deliberative 
theory takes a markedly more inclusionist stance towards religious argu-
ments than Rawls’ political liberalism. 
                                                                                                                                         
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1997), 162-81, 162; Audi & Wolterstorff, Religion in the 
Public Square, 162-3. 
45 Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited,’ 145. 
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With this third and most convincing argument Habermas does not so 
much emphasize the right of religious citizens to take part in public discus-
sion, but rather the loss for society as a whole in case they are prevented from 
doing so. Because we can never anticipate what we might learn from them, it 
is important to conserve as much as possible all cultural sources that nurture 
citizens’s solidarity and their normative awareness.46  
… for it cannot be sure that secular society would not otherwise cut itself off 
from key resources or the creation of meaning and identity. Secular citizens or 
those of other religious persuasions can also learn something from religious 
contributions under certain circumstances, for example, when they recognize 
buried intuitions of their own in the normative truth contents of a religious ut-
terance.47 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Summarizing our comparison of the Rawlsian and the Habermasian 
proviso, we come to a balanced conclusion. On the one hand, Rawls is more 
inclusionist than Habermas because for Habermas the transformation of reli-
gious into political arguments already has to be completed in the informal 
public sphere. Rawls, in contrast, leaves this informal sphere totally free and 
also allows religious arguments in the formal public sphere provided political 
reasons supporting the same position can be found in due course. On the 
other hand, Habermas is more inclusionist in the sense that Rawls seems to 
impose the proviso on all individuals as far as they vote on or even simply 
debate issues concerning constitutional essentials. Habermas regards such a 
demand as an unacceptable psychological burden on religious citizens who, 
in his opinion, are allowed to participate in public debate while, at the same 
time, remaining religious monoglots. Concerning the semantic impact of the 
proviso, finally, Habermas distinctively claims the more inclusionist position. 
Where Rawls states that the proviso guarantees that the political content of 
public reason remains unaltered, Habermas points out that religious argu-
ments can have a genuine semantic impact on the agreement at the end of 
the debate.  
 
                                                 
46 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 111. 
47 Ibid., 131. 
